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ARGUMENT 
I. SMITH'S ARGUMENT THAT THE APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT Is OTHER THAN "CORRECTNESS" IS A FALSE PREMISE - THE TRUTH Is 
THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST THAT MANDATE REVERSAL UNDER 
A CORRECTNESS STANDARD. 
Smith asserts the false premise that this Court's standard of review of a grant of 
summary judgment under UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c) is not "correctness," but rather the 
"limited review" of "no substantial evidence" that pertains to findings by a trial court 
under Rule 52(a). Smith's argument is nothing but a procedural strawman. Smith 
refuses to acknowledge the true procedural posture of this case, that is before this 
Court based on the trial court's grant of summary judgment, pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 
56(c). Any genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment under Rule 
56(c) - period. It does not matter whether the genuine issue of material fact relates to 
the factual issue of whether the parties to a contract intended a writing as an integration 
or whether the genuine issue of fact pertains to any other issue. Rule 56 says what it 
says and means what it plainly means - a genuine issue of material fact, on any 
material factual question, precludes summary judgment. 
The hollowness of Smith's arguments is revealed by Smith's telling failure to 
address the legal requirements for granting a Rule 56(c) motion, as set forth in 
Osguthorpe's Opening Brief, that "[o]n a motion for summary judgment, the moving 
party [here, Smith] bears the burden of proof for its motion, namely, the burden of 
proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 
329 (Utah 1997) (on rehearing). Significantly, Smith failed utterly to show this Court 
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how the trial court, or this Court, could conclude that no genuine issues of fact exist 
under the record as it exits. Smith's failure in that regard is attributable to the 
impossibility of the task. 
Smith tries to divert attention from the well-established standard of review, i.e., 
that "[a] trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness." 
Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 265, 2000 UT 20, fl 9. Smith proffers a remarkably new 
standard of review for Rule 56 motions, parsing out an exception not found anywhere in 
the plain language of the rule, for factual issues surrounding whether parties to a 
contract intended a writing to reflect the entirety of their agreement.. See Appellee's 
Brief, at 9. Smith argues that the standard of review for a rule 56 determination of that 
issue is different from all other factual determinations under the Rule, which are 
governed by the "correctness" standard of review universally applied to Rule 56 
determinations, and is, instead, a standard of limited review," citing Bailey-Allen Co. v. 
Kurzet, 945 P. 2d 180, 190 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
What Smith fails to point out in suggesting this new Rule 56 standard of review is 
that Bailey-Allen was decided after a trial on the merits, and findings of fact were thus 
entered under Rule 52(a), and not under Rule 56.1 See id. at 183 ("[T]he Kurzets 
1
 See Riley v. Brown & Root, Inc., 896 F.2d 474, 477 n. 5 (10th Cir.1990) 
("While the use of oral testimony on summary judgment motions is not improper, ... the 
determinations made in ruling on summary judgment materials and such testimony are 
not findings reviewable on the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a), but are 
reviewed under Rule 56(c) to ascertain whether there is an absence of any genuine 
issue as to any material fact and whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law."); Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2000)("[l]f the 
district court made any findings of fact, they are not entitled to the deference due 
findings of fact made after a trial on disputed factual issues."). When, as here, the 
movant has the burden of proof on a claim raised in a summary judgment motion, it 
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challenge the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact "). This Court in Elailey-Allen 
was not, therefore, contrary to the false premise asserted by Smith, rewriting the 
standards for summary judgment under Rule 56 or the appellate standard of review of 
"correctness" for all Rule 56 determinations. Instead, when this Court referenced that 
the finding of integration in that case was subject to "limited review" by the appellate 
court, it was saying so for the reason that all findings of fact entered pursuant to UTAH 
R. Civ. P. 52(a), after a full trial on the merits, regardless of whether integration is the 
fact issue involved, are subject to the "limited review" of no substantial evidence. 
The Bailey-Allen Court, in turn, cited Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 
547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), which was a summary judgment case. The Webb 
Court, however, in fact ruled that the extrinsic evidence sought to be introduced was 
inconsistent with the express, unambiguous terms of the contract at issue in that case. 
There was no discussion about extrinsic evidence proffered to refute the presumption 
that the contract was, as it appeared, intended to be an integration. The only 
conclusion derivable from that case which is consistent with the law on integration and 
the standards of Rule 56 was that no evidence was offered on summary judgment that 
raised a genuine issue of fact as to the parties' intent that the writing expressed their 
entire agreement, so the trial court was left with the unrebutted (but rebuttable, where 
must show that the undisputed facts establish every element of the claim entitling it to 
judgment as a matter of law and the standard is the same as that which would entitle 
the movant to a directed verdict at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 
331 (1986) ("If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party 
must support its motion with credible evidence- using any of the materials specified in 
Rule 56(c)-that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial."); Quaker 
State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 868 F.Supp. 1278, 1287 (D. Utah 
1994) (same). 
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evidence is, as in this case, offered) that the written agreement was integrated. Any 
other reading of that case would be an extraordinary departure from the requisites of 
Rule 56. Osguthorpes contend that, had the Webb Court in fact intended to rule so 
broadly, and so inconsistently with the plain language of Rule 56 and Utah Supreme 
Court decisions thereunder, it would have explained in detail its rationale, something it 
did not do. Webb must be therefore be read as restricted to its particular facts, namely, 
that the party opposing summary judgment offered no evidence to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact against the rebuttable presumption of integration in that case. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the Webb Court cited as support for 
its holding only two cases. The first, Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985), was not a Rule 56 case, but rather entailed a review of findings of fact entered 
under Rule 52(a), only after a full trial on the merits. See id. at 715 ("We hold that the 
trial court did not err in considering parol evidence and that the resulting findings and 
conclusions are supported by substantial record evidence.") Moreover, the question of 
integration was not in fact an issue on appeal in Kimball, as the Court's holding was 
directed to the propriety of admitting extrinsic evidence, not to resolve any issue of 
integration, but rather, to interpret ambiguity in an integrated agreement. See id. Webb 
also cited Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989), for 
the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court had affirmed a summary judgment on 
grounds that contradictory terms are not admissible even where a contract is only 
partially integrated. See Webb, at 551. In Blomquist, however, the written agreement 
9t issue contained a clear and unambiguous integration clause, where the parties had 
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expressly agreed that the writing expressed their full and complete understanding. See 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d at 1385 ("This impression [of integration] is confirmed by the fact 
that the contract contains an integration clause in paragraph 19(c) which states that the 
'agreement sets forth the entire understanding among the parties and shall not be 
amended or terminated except by a written instrument duly executed by all the parties 
hereto.'"). Since Rule 56 motions are reviewed by the same standards as motions for 
directed verdict,2 it must be assumed that the Blomquist Court had before it insufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of integration, such that no reasonable juror could 
have concluded that the written integration clause would not reflect the parties' actual 
intent at the time of contracting. See McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 
1977) ("If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on the issue in 
controversy, a jury question exists and the motion should be denied.") 
That major point of distinction alone prevents Blomquist from being applicable to 
this situation, where there is not only no integration clause, but (1) both parties to the 
contract testified that their full agreement was never intended to be reflected by the 
writing and (2) both parties subsequently modified the written agreement to expressly 
set forth that portion of the consideration flowing for the minimal use of the real 
property, at fair market value, and that portion of the consideration going to the 
consulting services component. Moreover, the case relied on for the conclusion in 
Blomquist, that evidence might be resolved in favor of integration, was State Bank of 
2
 See May v. General Motors Corp GMC Truck Division, 856 P.2d 1260, 
1264 (Utah 1993) (equating summary judgment standard with directed verdict 
standard). 
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Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977), in which, yet again, extrinsic evidence had 
been taken on the issue of integration at a trial on the merits, and resolved by the trial 
court, which entered a Rule 52(a) finding of integration, and Rule 52(a), not Rule 56, 
governed the standard of review. See Woolsey, 565 P.2d at 418 ("The court admitted 
evidence concerning this, oral agreement. However, it found the written documents 
introduced in evidence constituted the full and complete agreement of the parties.") A 
careful study of the case cited by Smith and the subsidiary cases on which it relied 
therefore reveals that the standards of Rule 56 do not change dependent upon whether 
the factual issue involved is integration. 
Instead, most of the cases cited for a "limited standard" are in reality dealing with 
the limited standard of review for factual findings entered under Rule 52(a), and not 
Rule 56 cases. In Webb and Blomquist, which were Rule 56 cases, the only conclusion 
from the cases is that legally insufficient evidence was introduced to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact on the issue of integration, such that no reasonable juror could 
have found against integration. In Webb, it simply appears that no evidence at all was 
introduced into the record to raise such a genuine issue of material fact. In Blomquist, it 
appears that the evidence that was introduced did not meet the Rule 56 standard of 
being a "genuine issue," because it was insufficient to persuade any reasonable juror, in 
light of the plain and unambiguous integration clause, that the writing was not intended 
to be integrated. 
Even in Blomquist, however, there is no indication that the standard of review 
under Rule 56 was modified. To the contrary, Blomquist expressly sets forth the typical 
6 
Rule 56 standard of review, of "correctness," as applicable to its determination: 
Our standard of review when considering challenges to a summary 
judgment is settled. A grant of summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R.CIV.P. 
56(c); see, e.g., Geneva Pipe Co. v. S &H Insurance Co., 714 P.2d 
648, 649 (Utah 1986). In determining whether the trial court 
correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we 
view the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. E.g., id. at 649; Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985). And in 
deciding whether the trial court properly granted judgment as a 
matter of law to the prevailing party, we give no deference to the 
trial court's view of the law; we review it for correctness. E.g., 
Atlas Corp., 737 P.2d at 229; Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 
716 (Utah 1985); see also Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). 
773P.2dat1385. 
Smith's argument that a standard of review other than "correctness" applies to 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case is therefore a false premise that 
should be rejected. In this case, numerous genuine issues of material fact in the record 
preclude summary judgment on damages as pointed out in the opening brief, including, 
without limitation: 
1. The initial agreement on what was, at that time, a $28 million transaction, 
contains no integration clause and is less than a page long; 
2. The second and third agreements, that increased the value of the deal to 
$56 million, also do not contain integration clauses and the drafter of those two 
agreements, Blaise Carrig, who was adverse to the Osguthorpes in the transaction, 
testified (a) he did not intend the writing to reflect the whole transaction; and (b) the 
transaction included a services component; 
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3. Blaise Carrig, who drafted those two amendments, testified that 
abbreviated documents such as these were not the norm for transactions entered into 
byASCUtah, Inc. Utah; 
4. All parties to this arms-length transaction testified that the annual payment 
was for two components: use of real estate and services. 
5. Stephen A. Osguthorpe is a named party to the transaction, but he never 
owned the real estate; 
6. The owner of the real estate at the time the litigation was filed, The Dr. D. 
A. Osguthorpe Trust, is entitled to the payments for real estate, not the defendants in 
this case. 
7. The written Restatement of Agreement expressly divided the annual 
payment between use of real estate and services. 
II. SMITH'S ARGUMENT THAT OSGUTHORPES' APPEAL IS BARRED BY THE LAW OF THE 
CASE Is ANOTHER FALSE PREMISE-THE TRUTH IS THAT THE OSGUTHORPES WON 
THE REVERSAL THEY SOUGHT ON THE DAMAGES JUDGMENT IN THEIR FIRST APPEAL, 
AND THIS COURT REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS; THE TRIAL COURT 
FAILED ON REMAND TO RESPECT THE SPIRIT OF THIS COURT'S REQUIREMENTS FOR 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
Smith first argues that "[disputed facts do not prevent summary disposition on 
the question of integration." Notably, Smith offers no citation to any authority for this 
proposition, and Rule 56 clearly offers Smith no refuge. Smith then offers the false 
premise, supposedly based on this Court's prior decision, that summary judgment may 
be entered in the face "of disputed facts or even in the face of uncontroverted opposing 
facts." Appellees' Brief at 10 (citing Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App. 361, H 46, 58 
8 
P.3d 854, 864 [hereinafter "Smith /"]). As was covered in Osguthorpes' Opening Brief, 
the statements in that paragraph are pure obiter dicta, not entitled to any law of the 
case effect. Even if they were, they could not be read as referring to anything but a trial 
court's prerogative to reject, on credibility grounds, unrefuted testimony after a trial on 
the merits, not on summary judgment. Osguthorpe pointed out in their Opening Brief 
that the citation relied on by this Court in Smith I was in fact a case where credibility had 
been hotly contested at a trial on the merits. So no law of the case could justify the trial 
court here in its refusal to hold a trial on the merits and determine credibility on 
summary judgment. 
Smith's next argument in this regard is that this Court issued a directive to the 
trial court simply "to make clear that he considered the parol evidence in ruling the 
lease and the amendments are integrated or to take evidence to determine integration." 
Appellee's Brief, at 11. Smith argues that the trial court's ruling, on his post-remand 
motion for summary judgment, which motion sought damages for additional sums never 
sought prior to the first appeal in Smith /, satisfies this Court's mandate, because the 
trial judge stated: "Although not specifically stated, the Court finds that after reviewing 
the procedural history in this matter, it is clear parole [sic] evidence was considered in 
the rulings it rendered in this matter. Indeed, in making its various decisions, the Court 
considered the Affidavits of D.A. Osguthorpe, Stephen Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. 
Moreover, the Court heard parole [sic] evidence during oral argument, prior to rendering 
its decision. In sum, summary judgment, as requested by plaintiff, is appropriate." 
Memorandum Decision, June 30, 2003 [entered July 8, 2003], at 3, R. 1192. 
Not only did the trial court not specifically state that it considered parol evidence 
9 
on the issue of integration, the record is clear that it did not do so. In the trial court's 
only specific ruling on integration, it referred solely and strictly to the then-existing 
written documents, themselves. Memorandum Decision, dated September 11, 2000 
[entered September 12, 2000], at 5, R. 606 ("As previously noted, the Court has already 
determined that the Lease Agreement is, in fact, a lease. Initially, the Lease called for 
payment of $100,000 due and payable on August 12 each year. The Lease was then 
amended in exchange for expanded use of the disputed property and called for 
payment of $150,000. Finally, the Lease was amended and payment was increased to 
$200,000 for further expansion use. Since all of the aforementioned amendments 
relate to the lease of the property, they are integrated.") 
In fact, the trial court was absolutely speculating as to how much property was 
used (no evidence was submitted at the time of that ruling as to the reasons for the 
increased payments). Later evidence in the record, that the trial court refused to 
consider, established that the bulk of the annual payment was for consultation and 
other services. At the time the trial court made its record in that regard, the trial court 
flatly refused to consider any of that evidence on Statute of Frauds grounds, and never 
even addressed the consideration of parol evidence for integration purposes. 
Memorandum Decision, dated May 25, 2001, at 6, R. 796 ("Indeed, no matter how the 
evidence is viewed, it is clear defendant's claim to a side oral agreement is barred by 
the statute of frauds.") It would seem impossible for the trial court to have considered 
evidence it barred. It is noteworthy that, nowhere in the record have Osguthorpes ever 
claimed the existence of a "side oral agreement," so the trial court's reference to 
evidence it was barring could only be to the parol evidence that showed not all of the 
10 
agreement was in writing. 
In the garnishment proceeding which is also part of this appeal, evidence was 
introduced that another written amendment of the ASC Utah/Osguthorpe agreement 
had been entered into, discussed in more detail below, expressly dividing the use of 
real estate and services portions of the now-written agreement, based upon the fair 
market value of the use of the real estate, by averaging two independent appraisals, 
and the value of the use of the real estate was, in fact, nominal, because the acreage 
was so small and Osguthorpes maintained the full right to use the same ground to 
graze and run livestock. 
If all this Court intended the trial court to do was recite the phrase that the trial 
court had considered the parol evidence, there would have been no need for a remand, 
because this Court could have considered that evidence, as part of its correctness 
review, and affirmed. But this Court did not see the record that way. This Court stated 
that "[w]e cannot determine from the record whether the district court considered the 
offered parol evidence to determine as a threshold matter whether the lease and the 
amendments are an integrated agreement." Smith 1,1145, 58 P.3d at 863. Osguthorpe 
does not believe that the spirit of this Court's decision in Smith I would have been to say 
to the trial judge that all he had to do was recite that he had considered the parol 
evidence, and that such a bare vecltal would make this Court's review any easier. No, 
this Court must have anticipated that, as in Blomquist, the trial court might have pointed 
to evidence that would meet a directed verdict standard, or else it would hold a trial. 
Although specifically requested by Osguthorpe to make findings to assist this Court, the 
trial court refused to do so, stating: "[T]he Court is persuaded its July 8, 2003 
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Memorandum Decision clearly follows the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals by 
reviewing the procedural history of the case and stating that it had considered the 
proffered parole [sic] evidence. Nothing remains to be considered." Minute Entry, 
dated August 27, 2003, at 1, R. 1257. 
The trial court failed to explain its ruling, as specifically requested by the 
Osguthorpes (See Defendants' Motion to Revisit and/or to Clarify the Court's July 8, 
2003 Memorandum Decision, R. 1209-10). Overwhelming evidence exists that the 
parties did not intend integration. That evidence could clearly lead a reasonable juror to 
so conclude and therefore precludes the summary judgment granted by the trial court. 
III. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THIS APPEAL IS A NEW JUDGMENT, THAT 
PURPORTS TO ENCOMPASS PAYMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL YEARS BEYOND THE 
ORIGINAL JUDGMENT; DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO POINT OUT THEY 
RECEIVED NO PORTION OF ANY SUCH PAYMENTS AND THAT SMITH FAILED TO 
ADDUCE ANY EVIDENCE IN HIS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, AS HE WAS 
REQUIRED TO DO. 
The original summary judgment on damages herein was reversed. Smith claims 
that Osguthorpe did not raise the issue of error in assessing the amount of damages on 
summary judgment in Osguthorpes' first appeal. See Appellee's Brief, at 16-17. That 
contention is yet another false premise. In Osguthorpes' Opening Brief in Smith /, 
Osguthorpe expressly raised as the twelfth issue on appeal the trial court's error in 
establishing an amount of damages on summary judgment: "Did the trial court err when 
it determined the amount of damages on summary judgment?" See Opening Brief of 
Appellants, Appellate No. 20010530-CA, at 5, that page attached as Appendix 1. This 
issue encompasses all errors made by the trial court in overlooking disputed issues of 
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material fact on damages, and thus would include the fact that payments made to the 
Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust, or to Stephen A. Osguthorpe, could not be included in any 
damages calculation. 
The Osguthorpes in fact prevailed on the issue that summary judgment was 
improper on the calculation of damages, because the judgment was reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. Smith /, fl 53, 58 P.3d. at 865. The fact is that a 
single genuine issue of material fact on integration was enough to prevail, and no other 
genuine issues of fact were necessary to the ruling of this Court and were not ruled on 
by this Court. Further, other than its directive that the trial court must consider extrinsic 
evidence of integration, there was absolutely no limitation imposed by this Court on the 
trial court in conducting any further proceedings on the issue of damages, and none 
may be fairly implied. Indeed, the trial court did not feel so restricted, because it 
increased the amount of damages by hundreds of thousands of dollars over the amount 
it entered in the first judgment, based on the entreaty by Smith, in his post-iremand 
motion for summary judgment (see Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Judgment, R. 1142-44), 
to add on to the damages award by including years of payments not considered in the 
prior proceedings. 
No limitations or restrictions were imposed on the trial court with respect to the 
proceedings on remand, and the existence of genuine issues of material fact and 
Smith's failure to demonstrate an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law 
encompassed by Smith's failure to adduce evidence of payments received by either 
D.A. Osguthorpe or the Osguthorpe Family Partnership, such that individual damages 
awards could be calculated against either of them, was raised and briefed on Smith's 
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post-remand motion for summary judgment. Therefore, there exists no constraint 
against this Court examining such factual disputes that preclude summary judgment 
now. See Helper State Bank v. Cms, 95 Utah 320, 81 P.2d 359, 364 (1938)("But where 
the case is remanded for a new trial, without any limitations or restrictions, then the 
case has not been finally determined, except insofar as the former decision has 
decided questions that are distinctly raised and are necessarily decided by the court in 
the former appeal.") 
IV. SMITH TREATS THE RECENT MODIFICATION IN THE FORM O F THE RESTATEMENT 
OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN ASC UTAH AS THOUGH IT IS INEFFECTUAL. 
At the time of the initial judgment herein, the most recent amendment of the ASC 
Utah/Osguthorpe, titled "Restatement of Agreement," dated August 1, 2001, attached 
hereto as Appendix 2 (R. 935-47; also attached to Appellants' Opening Brief as 
Addendum 10), did not exist. Smith now treats this latest amendment as though it is 
ineffectual.3 While Smith argues the sanctity of written agreements and argues that the 
parol evidence rule and statute of frauds preclude evidence modifying the original and 
first two amendments to the ASC Utah/Osguthorpe agreement, he offers no cogent 
reason, and no evidence, to avoid the effect of the Restatement of Agreement. See 
Appellee's Brief, at 19. 
That modification, on its face, states that it is entered into as a settlement of a 
dispute that arose between the Osguthorpe defendants herein, and in addition, 
Stephen A. Osguthorpe, individually, and The Dr. D A Osguthorpe Trust, on the one 
3
 Smith does not explain why prior modifications would be effectual and this 
recent one not effectual. 
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hand, and ASC Utah, Inc. Utah, on the other hand, concerning how the annual 
payments were to be made. See Restatement of Agreement, Recital I. The 
Restatement of Agreement then sets forth a contractual mechanism to determine the 
fair market value of the annual use of the real property, so as to allocate the annual 
payment between that use and the amount of payment to Stephen A. Osguthorpe, 
individually. Id., fl 4, at 6. This is the current agreement between two arms-length 
parties, and the agreement that governs the annual payment. 
After acknowledging that only $3,275.50 of the $200,000.00 payment was 
payable under the Restatement of Agreement for use of land, Smith offers the false 
premise that the full $200,000.00 "was properly included in the Computation of 
Judgment." Appellee's Brief, at 19. There is no attempt by Smith to explain how the 
requirements of Rule 56 were met. Indeed, Smith flouted the rules requiring that he set 
forth in separately numbered paragraphs statements of undisputed facts concerning 
damages evidence, including this payment under the Restatement of Agreement, to 
whom it was to be paid, or how it was properly allocated. Nor did Smith support any 
facts with citations to the record. Thus, Smith failed to show entitlement to summary 
judgment under Rule 56. 
V. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS ISSUE WAS DECIDED IN FAVOR OF THE 
OSGUTHORPES IN THE FIRST APPEAL AND IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Because Smith makes repeated references to the Statute of Frauds in 
Appellee's brief, Osguthorpes will address that issue. First, the Statute of Frauds was 
raised in the first appeal by Smith as a reason that the extrinsic evidence could not 
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raise a genuine issue of material fact, and Osguthorpes responded to that issue. See 
Appendix 3, containing those portions of briefs in the prior appeal addressing the issue. 
If Smith were correct in his argument, this Court would not have found it necessary to 
reverse and remand. Thus this issue was in fact impliedly decided in the first appeal 
and the law of the case has been established that the Statute of Frauds does not apply 
to the contract between Osguthorpes and ASC Utah. See Gaddis Investment Co. v. 
Morrison, 8 Uta2d 152, 153, 289 P.2d 730, 730 (1905) (implicit rulings become the law 
of the case). Even if it did apply, however, all of the arguments made by Osguthorpes 
on the first appeal are again dispositive in favor of Osguthorpes; namely, that Smith has 
no standing to raise the issue,4 the prior writings and admissions in the record are 
sufficient to establish the existence of an agreement, and the only question is whether 
oral terms exist not fully set forth in the writing. Now, there is the additional reason the 
Statute of Frauds does not apply, that the full Restatement of Agreement clearly is in 
writing and signed by each party. 
4
 In Garland v. Fleischmann, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that a 
litigant "is not entitled to raise the defense of the statute of frauds [where the litigant] 
was not a party to the contract, nor.. . in privity to the party to the contract. Garland v. 
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1992). In Garland, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly recognized that the admission of the parties to an oral contract that the 
contract exists is all that is necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds. See id. 
(emphasis added) (If both parties admit the existence of an oral contract, it is irrelevant 
that a stranger objects). The Garland case quoted with approval the following 
language: "[i]f the parties to the contract as in this case are willing to waive the 
requirement that the statute, a stranger to the contract cannot object." Id. (quoting 
Zwaska v. Irwin, 52 N.J. Super. 27, 33, 144 A.2d 554, 557 (1958). Thus, Smith was in 
no position to and "lacks standing to raise" the statute of frauds. Id. at 109. 
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VI. SMITH FAILS TO ADDRESS THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL GARNISHMENT WAS 
VOID O N REVERSAL OF THE FIRST JUDGMENT ON DAMAGES. 
Smith contends that it was alright for the trial court, after entry of the second 
judgment, without any form of process for execution on the second judgment, to release 
funds taken following the garnishment of ASC Utah, Inc. Utah after the first judgment, to 
Smith. Smith neither offers legal support, by rule or case law, for this position, nor 
addresses the controlling law cited in the Osguthorpes' Opening Brief that establishes 
the garnishment on the first judgment was void. 
The order releasing funds to Smith should be reversed and the funds ordered 
paid back to ASC Utah, Inc. Utah, so it can meet its contractual obligations under the 
Restatement of Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, this Court should reverse the summary 
judgment entered by the trial court and remand for further proceedings on damages, 
and it should reverse the final order on the garnished funds under the first judgment, 
releasing such funds to Smith, and order Smith to repay those funds to ASC Utah, Inc., 
so that ASC Utah, Inc. may meet its contractual obligations under the Restatement of 
Agreement. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of June, 2004. 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this \*\ day 
of June, 2004, to the following: 
Hardin A. Whitney 
Moyle & Draper, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David W. Scofield 
Robert G. Wing 
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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APPENDIX 1 
1992). 
12. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined the amount of damages 
on summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Brown v. l/l/e/s, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 
1994) (citations omitted). 
13. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined, as a matter of law, that 
the Lease Agreement, and the amendments to that agreement, was not, in fact, an 
easement. 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953), Estate or interest in real property. See Addendum 3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953), Leases and contracts for interest in lands. Id. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 (1953), Partnership property. Id. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12, Defenses and Objections. See Addendum 4. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15, Amended and Supplemental Pleadings. Id. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19, Joinder of Persons Needed For Just Adjudication. Id. 
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APPENDIX 2 
RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this / day of August, 20013 to be 
effective as of August 14, 1996 ("Effective Date"), by and among D, A. Osgutiiorpe' 
("Osguthoipe"), D, A. Osguthoipe Family Partnership ("Partnership"), p.A. Osguthorpe, as 
trustee of The Dr. DA. Osguthorpe Trust ("Trust"), Stephen A. Osguthorpe ("S. Osguthorpe") 
and ASC Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation ("ASCU"). Osgutiiorpe, the Trust, the Partnership, 
S. Osguthorpe, and ASCU are collectively referred to herein as the "Parties", or singly ^s a 
"Party" as the context requires or permits. 
RECITALS: 
.A. Osguthorpe, the Trust and/or the Partnership is the owner of certain real property 
consisting of approximately 560 acres as described in annexed Exhibit "A" (the Property"); 
B. By agreement dated August 14, 1996, Osguthorpe, the Partnership and Wolf. 
Mountain Resorts, LX.C. (predecessor-in-interest to ASCU) ("Wolf5) entered into that certain 
agreement (the "Initial Agreement") under which Osgutiiorpe and the Partnership granted certain 
rights to Wolf in, to and over the Property for use as a commercial recreational area, including 
the installation, maintenance and operation of two (2) ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski 
trails and such other related facilities, structures and roads as may be required to allow Wolf to 
use the Property as a commercial recreation area, and Osguthorpe agreed to provide services to 
Wolf, 
C. On July 28, 1997, ASCU, Osguthorpe, the Partnership and S. Osguthorpe entered 
into a certain agreement amending and clarifying certain provisions of the Initial Agreement (the 
"First Amendment*8); 
EXHIBIT B 
D. Among other things. Hie First Amendment provided'that ASCU "will include the 
Osgufhorpes in their master planning process"; 
E. On August 10, 1998, Osguthorpe, the Partnership, S, Osguthorpe and ASCU 
entered into an agreement (Hie "Second Amendment?*) (the Initial Agreement, First Amendment 
and Second Amendment are herein referred to collectively as the "Documents") which amends 
the Initial Agreement and the First Amendment; 
F. On or about May 13,1998, the Trust acquired an interest in the Property; 
G. ASCU is the owner and operator of The Canyons resort and Hie Property is used 
in ASCU's operations. ASCU intends to expand its operations on the Property and, as it has 
done in the past, ASCU intends to hire personal services of Osguthorpe and/or S. Osguthorpe to 
assist it in the master planning or development of The Canyons resort; 
H. S. Osguthorpe has provided, and agrees to provide in the future, services to ASCU 
to assist ASCU in its master planning and development process for The Canyons resort; 
L A dispute has arisen between Osguthorpe, the Trust, the Partnership, 
S. Osguthorpe and ASCU regarding, among other things, whether the payments under the 
Documents are payments for lease rentals and services rendered or whether the payments are 
solely for lease rentals; 
J. The Parties desire to resolve tlieir disputes by clarifying the provisions of the 
Documents and establishing a process to (i) allocate that portion of the annual payment to the fair 
market value for ASCU's rights in and to the Property and to use the Property as part of its 
operations of The Canyons resort, and (ii) pay for services provided by Osguthorpe and/or 
S. Osguthorpe under the Documents; and 
K. The Parties desire to set forth tlieir understandings and agreements in writing, 
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NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of Hie mutual agreements and covenants set forth 
herein and for otlier good and valuable consideration, tlie receipt, sufficiency and adequacy 
which is hereby acknowledged by each of tlie Parties, the Parties agree as follows: 
L Restatement of Documents, Tlie Initial Agreement, First Amendment and Second 
Amendment are hereby amended and restated in their entirety. 
2. Easement Grant. Osguthorpe, tlie Trust and the Partnership hereby grant, and 
reaffirm tlie granting of, an easement (the "Easemenf') on, under and over Hie Property to ASCU 
for use as a commercial recreational area, including tlie installation, maintenance and operation 
of two (2) ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails and such other related facilities, 
structures and roads as maybe required for such use. Specifically Saddleback and Doc's Knob 
chair lifts as identified on annexed Exhibit "B", including ski trails servicing Doc's Knob and 
lower sliver of the quarter section additionally identified on annexed Exhibit "B'\ Ski trials, lifts 
and facilities shall not be constructed on Hie southernmost parcel #6 (40 acres) and parcel #5 (40 
acres) other than those previously identified on the Property as described in annexed 
Exhibit UB'\ 
2,1 Tlie Parties agree and acknowledge that in connection with the Easement 
ASCU has performed, or is hereby given the right to" perform, the following: 
2.1.1 ASCU will construct a jeep/snowmobile road from the top of 
Saddleback towards Red Pine Lake md on toward the bottom of Saddleback area* The road will 
also be continued from the top of Saddleback to the northwest corner of Section 3. 
S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig will approve the alignment prior to construction. 
2.1.2 ASCU will relocate and upgrade Hie existing Saddleback lift to the 
location approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. 
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2.1.3 ASCU will be able to complete tlie Saddleback area trail 
construction as approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. 
2.1.4 ASCU is able to relocate and upgrade tlie existing Spotted Owl 
chair to tlie location shown on the attached map. This relocation to be approved by Blaise Carrig 
and S. Osguthorpe. 
2.1.5 ASCU will repair and upgrade the lower jeep road on tlie Property 
as shown on the attached map for construction and maintenance access. 
2.L6 ASCU will construct and maintain a road on the Property from 
Red Pine Lake to the top of Tombstone. This road is to be used by tlie Canyons construction and 
maintenance only. 
2.1.7 ASCU commits to working with Osguthorpe and Partnership to 
ensure that snowmobile and horse riding operation can continue for the entire term of this 
Agreement. ASCU is committed to working with Osguthorpe and Partnership to resolve any 
issues of the interference or conflict between these operations and the ski development of The 
Canyons resort 
2.1.8 ASCU can construct a ski trail that crosses the south west corner of 
lot 5 of the Property quarter section. This trail to be approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise 
Carrig, 
2.1*9 ASCU will construct and maintain a work access road from the 
existing road at Red Pine Lake' through the sound end of section 3 towards the area known as 
Ninety Nine - 90 of the Property, S. Osgutliorpe and Blaise Carrig to approve the alignment of 
tlie rod prior to construction. 
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2.L10 ASCU will be permitted to have alpine ski operations (consistent 
with tlieir current operations) on the north side of Ninety Nine - 90 and through the southeast 
corner of section 3 of the Property. 
2.2 ASCU acknowledges that under the Documents Osguthorpe and 
Partnership have retained the right to use all of the Property as part of their ranch operation, 
including, without limitation, grazing and.other activities in connection with tlieir sheep and 
cattle operation, and to otherwise use and improve the Property, so long as such ranch operations 
and other use and improvements do not damage the towers or other facilities lawfully 
constructed on the Property by ASCU (or its predecessors-in-interest) and does not unreasonably 
interfere with the use of the Property by ASCU in the winter as part of ASCU's winter skiing 
operations. ASCU agrees that use of the Property during the spring, summer and fall months 
will not interfere with the ranch operations of Osguthorpe and the Partnership. 
2.3 The term of the Easement is. for twenty-eight (28) years commencing 
August 14, 1996. 
3. Services. Osguthorpe and/or S. Osguthorpe agree to make themselves available 
for consultation and/or render services to ASCU in conjunction with the operation of The 
Canyons resort, the master planning for and the development of The Canyons resort, and such 
other services as are reasonably requested by ASCU and which are necessary for the 
development of The Canyons resort. ASCU agrees that Osguthorpe and/or S, Osguthorpe shall 
have the right to delegate to a third person approved by ASCU those services required of them 
under this Section 3. 
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*4.. Annual Consideration* The total annual aggregate consideration for the Easement 
and services rendered under this Agreement shall -be Two Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($200,000). The Parties agree that this total consideration will be apportioned as follows: 
4.1 Within sixty (60) calendar days prior to August 12, 2001, Osguthorpe, the 
Trust or the Partnership and ASCU shall each have appointed a real estate appraiser (each such 
appraiser shall have no less than ten (10) years5 experience) who shall provide appraisals setting 
fortli Hie fair market value of the Easement At or prior to the expiration of such sixty (60) day 
period, the Parties shall, for purposes of establishing the fait market value of the Easement, take 
an average of the two (2) appraised values of the Easement and such average shall be the amount 
of consideration to be allocated as payment for the Easement. 
4.2 All of the remaining part of the animal consideration of Two Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($200,000) shall be allocated to the payment for availability for consultation 
and/or of services rendered tinder and in accordance with the provisions of Section 3. 
4.3 The annual consideration is due and payable by ASCU to the Osguthorpes 
not later than August 12 of each year. 
S. Mutual Covenants. The Parties mutually covenant and agree as follows: 
5.1 Each Party agrees to work with ^ach other Party in good faith to 
accomplish the intended purposes of this Agreement to maintain open communications. 
5.-2 ASCV assumes ibo obligation to notify Osguihorpe, ib& Trust and tiie 
Partnership and to seek their approval of any matters of change to the Property. 
*>. Successors and Assigns. This Agreement and its provisions shall be binding upon 
and inui-e to the benefit of the respective heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns of 
each of the Parties. 
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7. Memorandum of Agreement. Simultaneous with the execution of this Agreement, 
the Parties shall execute and record the Memorandum of Agreement annexed as Exhibit "C". 
8. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts and delivered by 
facsimile. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Hie Parties have executed mis document as of tire Effective 
Date. 
OSGUTHORPE 
'^sOfa^jj 
D. A. Osgulhorpe/ 
THE PARTNERSHIP: 
D. A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP 
THE TRUST: 
THE DR D.A. OSGUTHORPE TRUST 
£&@kf*&. 
D.A. Osguthtfrpe, Trustee 
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ASCU: 
ASC UTAH, INC., A Maine coiporatioa 
By: 
Print Name: 
Title: vr-ZftHX 
^ 
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EXHIBIT A 
TO 
RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT 
Legal Description 
The following described property is located in Summit County, Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows; 
PARCEL 1: 
Lots 3,4, 5 and 6, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
PARCEL 2: 
Lots 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and the Southeast VA of Section 3, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
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EXHIBIT B 
TO 
RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT 
Property Map 
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EXHIBIT C 
TO 
RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT 
Memorandum of Agreement 
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WHEN RECORDED, PLEASE MAIL TO: 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Attention: Sham C. Ferriii 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ASC Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation 
("ASCU55); and D, A. Osguthorpe, the D, A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, DA. Osguthorpe, 
as trustee of The D.A Osguthorpe Trust, and Stephen A, Osguthorpe ("collectively, 
"Osffliflioirpe"), have entered into that certain Restatement of Agreement dated August 1, 2001 
("Agreement"), which establishes, among other things, certain rights and obEgations by and among 
Osguthorpe and ASCU concerning a certain parcel of real property located in Summit County, Utah 
and more particularly described on Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
All of the terms and provisions of the Agreement are hereby incorporated herein by 
reference. Additional information regarding the Agreement may be obtained by contacting any of 
the following: 
Party 1: ASC Utah, Inc. 
The Canyons 
4000 The Canyons Resort Drive 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Attention: Managing Director 
Party 2: 
This Memorandum in no way modifies or amends the terms and provisions of the 
Agreement This Memorandtnn is executed solely for tlie purpose of providing record notice of 
the Agreement and is to be recorded in the real property records of Summit County, Utah. 
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APPENDIX 3 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ENOCH 
SMITH, JR., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
-vs-
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual, and 
D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY 
PARTERNSHIP, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 20010530-CA 
District Court Case No. 980911302 
Argument Priority 15 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI, 
DATED JUNE 6,2001 
HARDIN A. WHITNEY 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9015 
ROBERT G. W I N G 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Facsimile: (801) 524-1098 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD - 4140 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4378 
Attorneys for Appellants D A Osguthorpe and 
D A Osguthorpe Family Partnership 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
2. D. A. Osguthorpe Has Provided Evidence That He Always 
Owned Full Fee Title, So Nothing Could be Conveyed to Him 
By Smith or the Oral Partnership. 
The trial court confusingly characterized D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony regarding 
the Oral Dissolution Agreement as representing a "claim" by D. A. Osguthorpe "to 
ownership of the disputed property - because of a prior oral agreement with Smith...." 
Memorandum Decision at 4, R. 205. The trial court then apparently erroneously 
refused to consider the already-completed dissolution by oral agreement of the Oral 
Partnership, ruling that it was precluded by the Statute of Frauds. See id. However, as 
D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony makes plain, the Oral Dissolution Agreement did not in 
any way encompass any transfer of real estate - the Oral Partnership never owned 
any. 
In fact, D. A. Osguthorpe was already the sole fee owner of the subject real 
property, and the Oral Dissolution Agreement had nothing to do with that or any other 
real estate. To the contrary, D. A. Osguthorpe specifically testified that fee title to the 
property in question had been owned by him prior to formation of the Oral Partnership 
and that he had never transferred that real estate to the Oral Partnership. See Affidavit 
of D. A. Osguthorpe filed June 21, 1999, R. 117, fl4 ("Prior to the formation of the 
Partnership, I owned fee title to all of the Disputed Property. Title to the Disputed 
Property was never transferred from my name to the Partnership."); Affidavit of D. A. 
Osguthorpe, filed April 28, 2000 R. 300, U 4 ("When the oral agreement creating the 
Partnership was made in approximately 1959, I never intended and never agreed to 
make the Disputed Property a part of the assets owned by Partnership. Similarly, at no 
time after the Partnership was created did I ever intend or agree to or actually do so. I 
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never signed, delivered or recorded any deed transferring ownership of the Disputed 
Property from me to the Partnership or any other person while the Partnership was in 
existence. The assets of the Partnership consisted solely of the sheep and cattle that 
Smith and I owned through the Partnership. The Partnership owned no real property 
anywhere. [Emphasis added]").4 
It is not only uncontroverted by virtue of D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony that he, 
not Smith or the Oral Partnership, was the owner of the subject real estate, the fact is 
also proven by the expert testimony of Mary Katherine Johnston, a title examiner, in her 
Affidavit, dated April 28, 2000, R. 308-330. Ms. Johnston's affidavit attaches as an 
exhibit, an abstract of the Warranty Deed from Tracy Land & Livestock Company to D. 
A. Osguthorpe, executed March 29, 1958, and recorded April 1, 1959, with the Summit 
County Recorder's Office. See R. 329. Indeed, Smith has specifically and expressly 
conceded that Ms. Johnston's title work is accurate. See Memorandum In Support of 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe and Mary Katherine Johnston, filed May 
17, 2000, R. 421 ("Smith does not dispute the information in the Title Report 
Although Smith alleged that the subject real estate became Oral Partnership property 
by operation of law, he has never disputed D. A. Osguthorpe's statement regarding the 
record title of the Disputed Property.") 
There is also additional evidence, in the form of negative evidence, that in fact 
neither the Oral Partnership nor Smith, individually, held any real property to sell to D. 
A. Osguthorpe (and, also, that nothing was left to do by the time the 1966 Document 
4
 Thus, the Statute of Frauds does not, as Smith argued, apply to the 
already-performed oral agreement to dissolve a partnership that owned no real estate. 
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was signed). Paragraph 3 of the 1966 Document has Smith agreeing "to execute and 
deliver to [Osguthorpe] such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as may be 
necessary to transfer and convey to [Osguthorpe] all of the interests in the partnership 
businesses of [Smith] as hereinabove provided . . . ." R. 12, ^  3. Had Smith or the Oral 
Partnership in fact owned real estate, or any interest in the real estate that they would in 
fact sell to D. A. Osguthorpe, Smith could have produced deeds or other documents 
purporting to effectuate actual transfers. 
The absence of such documents merely buttresses D. A. Osguthorpe's 
testimony that he at all times was the owner of the real estate in question. Thus, the 
uncontroverted evidence establishes that: (1) D. A. Osguthorpe was the owner of and 
solely held fee record title to the subject real estate at all material times; (2) the Oral 
Partnership was formed upon an oral agreement and was dissolved upon an oral 
agreement which called for the purchasing party to pay $50,000 to the other party for all 
interest in the Oral Partnership and Oral Partnership assets; and (3) the oral dissolution 
agreement had been fully performed and the Oral Partnership dissolved and terminated 
long prior to the execution of the 1966 Document. 
As has been noted above in the section on standards governing summary 
judgment, Smith must show entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. In 
other words, Smith must prove every element of his breach of contract claim. See, e.g. 
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) ("On a motion for 
summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of proof for its motion, namely, 
the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The law in Utah is clear that 
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the burden of proving consideration is on the party seeking to recover on the contract. 
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, ex rel. First Security Bank, 764 P.2d 628, 631-32 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) ("If plaintiff fails to show there is consideration to support the contract, 
that party has failed to meet its burden and the contract will be held invalid by the court. 
[Citation omitted.] In a contract action in this state, consideration or a legally sufficient 
substitute for consideration must be established as part of plaintiffs prima facie case.") 
Here, the only proffered evidence of consideration for the 1966 Document offered by 
the plaintiff, or appearing anywhere in the record, is the 1966 Document itself. 
The only evidence offered by Smith in this case, at any time, concerning proof of 
a valid contract is the 1966 Document itself. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, R. 56-80. Smith has conceded at oral argument that the 
only evidence to support his claim that he or the Oral Partnership had any interest in the 
subject real estate is the 1966 Document. Tr. of July 31, 2000 hearing, R. 956, Tab 2, 
at 12:17-20 ("What we know about is that we have the [1966 Document]. The [1966 
Document] says that Smith has an interest in this disputed property. Well, that's the 
evidence that we have."5 The 1966 Document, however, contains no recitals of any 
5
 Prior to* this concession at oral argument, an unauthenticated, unaudited 
financial, without authentication or foundation, had been proffered by Smith. See R. 
138-142. Smith had argued that the document showed that the subject real property 
was an asset of the Oral Partnership because of an ostensible entry on balance sheet 
for assets under a line item titled "Land (unencumbered)," with an ostensible value of 
$23,711.25. R. 140. Not only is that document unauthenticated, unaudited, lacking in 
all foundation and clear hearsay, which would prevent its admissibility in any event, D. 
A. Osguthorpe testified that any assertion that the Oral Partnership owned land valued 
at $23,711.25 was false, in that the Oral Partnership never owned any real property, 
including the subject real property. R. 303, fflf 11-12. Additionally, D. A. Osguthorpe 
testified that he and Smith, through the Oral Partnership, grazed sheep and cattle over 
(continued...) 
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previous conveyance by D. A. Osguthorpe to either Smith or the Oral Partnership and 
the record is devoid of any such writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds. Examining the 
1966 Document, R. 7-14, it can be seen that the 1966 Document itself does not have a 
specific recital of any consideration flowing to D. A. Osguthorpe. 
Smith points to paragraph 1(g) of the 1966 Document, R. 9-10, as support for his 
contention that consideration exists. Paragraph 1(g) contains a promise by Smith, 
individually, (not the Oral Partnership) to sell Smith's undefined interest in the subject 
real estate to D. A. Osguthorpe.6 It is noteworthy that paragraph 1(g) refers to some 
undefined individual interest of Smith, rather than any Oral Partnership interest in the 
property. Smith's argument that paragraph 1(g) constitutes consideration overlooks a 
fundamental problem Smith has. The real property in question and described in 
paragraph 1(g) has uncontrovertedly been held at all times by D. A. Osguthorpe, not 
Smith and not the Oral Partnership. D. A. Osguthorpe has offered evidence proving his 
prior and continuing ownership. 
Seeking to overcome that problem, Smith argued to the trial court that the 1966 
Document, itself, constituted a conveyance of D. A. Osguthorpe's own real estate to the 
5(.. .continued) 
several properties, some owned by D. A. Osguthorpe, some by Smith, and some by 
other parties. R. 300-302, fl 6(a)-(i). In fact, the use of the subject real property by the 
Oral Partnership was limited to trailing sheep and cattle and was never used by the Oral 
Partnership for grazing the Oral Partnership's livestock. R. 302, fl 6(i). Smith's 
concession at oral argument that his evidence of consideration was the 1966 Document 
apparently came after reflection upon these infirmities in the admissible financial 
statement. 
6
 This argument, as pointed out above, itself is invalid because it violates 
the Statute of Frauds by its lack of specificity as to what interest is claimed to be 
conveyed. 
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Partnership by virtue of its "declaration," as argued by Smith, that the real estate was a 
"partnership asset" under paragraph 1. That argument fails for two reasons. First, the 
1966 Document, as pointed out above, itself concedes that the Oral Partnership had 
terminated prior to the time the 1966 Document was executed (the parties "have 
heretofore terminated all partnership relations entered into by them as partners and 
have discontinued the partnership businesses, dissolved the partnership or 
partnerships that have heretofore existed between them . . . . " ) . Thus, there was no 
Oral Partnership in existence that could have received any conveyance of real estate 
Smith argues was made by the 1966 Document. 
Second, paragraph 1 lists Oral Partnership assets in subparagraphs (a) through 
(f) of paragraph 1. R. 8-9. Then, in subparagraph (g), the subparagraph Smith relies 
on, where it states "in addition to the above-described property, [Smith] agrees to 
sell to [D. A. Osguthorpe] his interest in7 the following described real property . . . 
7
 The language of the 1966 Document itself, showing that it was Smith, 
individually, not the Oral Partnership, that agreed to "sell" D. A. Osguthorpe's own 
property to him is significant, because it controverts Smith's argument that the Oral 
Partnership somehow owned an interest in the real estate. Before the trial court, Smith 
had cited to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5: "All property originally brought into the 
partnership stock, or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the 
partnership, is partnership property." But that provision does not avail Smith because 
he offers no evidence that D. A. Osguthorpe "originally brought" the real estate "into the 
Oral Partnership" or that the subject real property was "subsequently acquired . . . on 
account of the Oral Partnership," and the language of the 1966 Document itself that 
refers to "his interest" fl[ 1(g), R. 9), meaning the First Party, Smith, rather than the Oral 
Partnership. Thus, the precise language of the 1966 Document belies Smith's 
argument that the Oral Partnership ever had any interest in the subject real property. 
Yet the trial court, even with those obstacles to Smith's argument based on the 1966 
Document, and with D. A. Osguthorpe's uncontroverted testimony to the contrary, and 
the Title Report, ruled that the subject real property was Oral Partnership property, not 
D. A. Osguthorpe's. That ruling is plain error. 
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subject, however, to the reservation of interests therein by [Smith] as hereinafter 
specifically set forth [Emphasis supplied.]" R. 9. It is noteworthy that the document 
never seeks to describe what interest, exactly, Smith in fact holds in the real property 
that he would be selling to D. A. Osguthorpe. 
To meet his burden, Smith needed to prove a conveyance by D. A. Osguthorpe 
to him or the Oral Partnership. It is black letter law that "land owned individually by one 
who enters into a partnership cannot become a partnership asset absent some written 
agreement sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds." Ludwig v. Walter, 331 S.E.2d 
177, 179 (N.C. App. 1985) (citing 60 AM. JUR. 2D, Partnership § 98 (1960)) (stating "we 
do not believe the General Assembly intended to abrogate [the Statute of Frauds] by 
enacting the [Uniform Partnership Act]."); Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 919 (Ariz. 
App. 1980); Pappas v. Gounaris, 311 S.W.2d 644, 645-46 (Tex. 1958). See also, 45 
A.LR.2d § 1009, § 5 (1956) (citing cases for the proposition that "land ownership 
individually by one who thereafter enters into a partnership agreement cannot become 
an asset of the partnership in the absence of a written agreement sufficient to satisfy 
the statute [of frauds]); 72 AM. JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds § 70 (1999) (citing cases for 
the proposition that "in order to place in the partnership the title to property owned by 
one partner at the formation of the partnership, or to make such property a partnership 
asset, the [partnership] agreement must be in writing, the same as any other contract 
for the sale of land."). 
Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (Utah CI:. App. 1990) 
is on all fours with this black letter law. Frontier sold a piece of property to Glezos 
under a real estate contract. Shortly thereafter, Shire Development (and Albert 
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Charboneau) entered into a joint venture agreement with Glezos to participate in the 
purchase, development and sale of the same property from Frontier. Frontier was not a 
party to the joint venture agreement. Shire advanced money to Frontier for the 
purchase of the property. Glezos later defaulted on the real estate contract, and, 
pursuant to the contract, Frontier forfeited Glezos's interest in the property and retained 
the entire amount paid as liquidated damages. Shire sued Frontier under the real 
estate contract. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Frontier, ruling, in part, that 
Shire had no standing to sue under the contract. On appeal, Shire argued the oral joint 
venture agreement constituted an assignment of the real estate contract from Glezos, 
which provided it with standing. Frontier responded that if any assignment had been 
made, it would have involved the transfer of a property interest, and therefore would 
have had to be in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 223. This Court agreed. 
If the oral joint venture agreement were construed to be an assignment of real property, 
"it would have to be in writing to comply with the statute of frauds." Id. at 224. 
Accordingly, Shire had no standing to sue under the real estate purchase contract 
because it could not demonstrate that Glezos made a written assignment of his interest 
in the contract. Id. 
For the Oral Partnership to acquire an interest (any interest) in the real property 
owned by D.A. Osguthorpe, the conveyance of that interest had to be evidenced by a 
written memorandum evidencing clearly an intent to convey, preferably a deed. See 
Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995): 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that the preferred way to 
transfer an interest in land and meet the requirements of the 
statute of frauds is by deed. Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 
Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1970) (holding that documents 
purporting to create profit a prendre were insufficient under statute 
of frauds). However, a real property interest may be transferred 
through other documents and memoranda revealing an intent to 
transfer an interest in real property. Id... . Words that "clearly 
show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, provided the 
language is certain and definite in its term." Martinez v. Martinez, 
93 N.M. 673, 604 P.2d 366, 368 (1979). 
Id. Because it is undisputed that no written memorandum of any kind was ever created 
to evidence the alleged conveyance of a defined interest in the subject real estate, the 
Oral Partnership did not acquire such an interest. Since the Oral Partnership never 
acquired an interest in the Disputed Property, the Oral Partnership could not, through 
paragraph 1(g) of the Dissolution Agreement, purport to "convey" a nonexistent interest 
to Osguthorpe. There was no consideration and the 1966 Document is unenforceable 
against Osguthorpe. 
Having no interest to "sell" to D. A. Osguthorpe, the promise to sell subject to a 
reservation of interest does not constitute anything other than an illusory promise which 
will not suffice for consideration, any more than if Smith had promised to sell D. A. 
Osguthorpe his interest in the Brooklyn Bridge. 
3. Smith Has Offered No Evidence of Any Belief in an Existing, 
Bona Fide Dispute, Such That the Release Would Constitute 
Consideration. 
The other consideration argued by Smith is in the form of the release of 
supposed claims. See 1966 Document, fl 5, R. 12. But Smith has a similar problem 
here, as well. The already-completed dissolution of the Oral Partnership and already-
accepted payment of the purchase price to Smith had already occurred before the 1966 
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Document was ever signed. The evidence in the record on that issue is 
uncontroverted. In the Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, filed April 28, 2000, at paragraph 
13, D. A. Osguthorpe testified: "The Partnership was dissolved at that point [when he 
paid $50,000 to Smith and Smith accepted] on those terms by our agreement." R. 304. 
More emphatically, D. A. Osguthorpe testified that, after the acceptance of $50,000 by 
Smith and from that point in time to the point that D. A. Osguthorpe signed the 1966 
Document "Smith and I never sued each other, or otherwise engaged in any kind of 
dispute over whether the dissolution was in fact completed. After I paid him the 
$50,000, we had no obligations or liabilities to the other. I did not sign the [1966 
Document] in compromise of any claim, none had been or was asserted, and I received 
no consideration whatsoever for signing. I signed only because [Smith's attorney, 
Oscar Moyle] represented that it was necessary to document the dissolution that had 
already occurred." R. 304. 
The uncontroverted testimony is that Smith received the $50,000 he was owed 
by D. A. Osguthorpe, that the dissolution was thereby concluded, that Smith afterward 
raised no dispute of any kind, and that Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe remained friends. 
See R. 959, at 27:18 - 28:20, 33:22 - 36:4; R. 305, fl 17. Absent some evidence of an 
actual existing dispute, there is no consideration offered by any purported release. See 
Jones v. Admiral Insurance Co., 195 Ga. App. 765, 765, 395 S.E. 2d 234, 234 (1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that consideration would exist in the form of a 
"bargained-for settlement" only where "the parties in good faith believe there is a 
disputed or uncertain claim " England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1997). 
Since no such evidence exists in this record, there is no consideration provided by the 
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ostensible release of non-existent claims. 
Since D. A. Osguthorpe had already purchased the Oral Partnership business 
and assets pursuant to the parties' oral agreement, and had paid all of the money to 
Smith to effectuate that exchange, there were no remaining partnership affairs to be 
wound up. They had all been wound up long ago by virtue of the agreement to dissolve 
the Oral Partnership and sell its assets. There was nothing to release. 
B. There is No Written Memorandum Meeting the Requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds to Show Any Conveyance to Smith or the Oral 
Partnership or Any Interest in the Subject Real Estate That They 
Could Convey Back. 
Smith contends that the 1966 Document, itself, evidences the conveyance of the 
subject real estate from D. A. Osguthorpe to the Oral Partnership. Smith also contends 
that that same document provides consideration to D. A. Osguthorpe by virtue of 
paragraph 1(g), where Smith, individually, promises to "sell" to D. A. Osguthorpe his 
"interest" in the subject real property ("[Smith] agrees to sell to [D. A. Osguthorpe], his 
interest in [the subject real property] (emphasis added)." R. 9, U 1(g). 
1. The 1966 Document does not show a conveyance by D. A. 
Osguthorpe to Smith or the Oral Partnership. 
D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP pointed out to the trial court that the 1966 Document 
cannot create any interest in the subject real property in either Smith or the Oral 
Partnership. In order to show a conveyance from D. A. Osguthorpe to either Smith or 
the Oral Partnership, of any interest in the subject real estate, a writing sufficient to 
meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds must exist. See Shire Development v. 
Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (If the oral joint venture 
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agreement at issue were construed to be an assignment of real property "it would have 
to be in writing to comply with the statute of frauds.") Smith points only to the 1966 
Document as that writing. Smith contends that the 1966 Document, itself, is a sufficient 
writing, subscribed by D. A. Osguthorpe, because it "declare[s]" it to be. This argument 
ignores, however, the absence of any language evidencing any intent on the part of D. 
A. Osguthorpe to transfer his ownership. To be enforceable under the Statute of 
Frauds, the written memorandum must "state[] with reasonable certainly the essential 
terms of the . . . contract." 72 AM. JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds § 214, at 730 (2001) 
(citing Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 131 (1979)). The absence of any terms or 
conditions for the purported transfer by D. A. Osguthorpe to the Oral Partnership, and 
the complete absence of any language indicating any intention to make a transfer, grant 
or conveyance, the 1966 Document is not a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds. 
2. The 1966 Document does not sufficiently describe any 
"interest" Smith purported to convey to D. A. Osguthorpe. 
With respect to the sale of Smith's undefined and nebulous "interest" referred to 
in paragraph 1(g), to D. A. Osguthorpe, that, too, is insufficient to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds. First and foremost, Smith's apparent contention that his "interest" was fee 
ownership is unsupported by any evidence. Thus, the "interest" purporting to be 
conveyed by the 1966 Document is inadequate as consideration, and inadequate to 
meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds: 
Where a seller of land owns only one estate which answers the 
description in the memorandum, that must be taken to be the 
estate to which the memorandum refers, and a memorandum that 
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contains only a slight description of such estate will satisfy the 
requirements of the statute of frauds. The fact as to ownership, 
though not mentioned in the writing, clearly appears to be one of 
the "attending circumstances" to be considered by the court in 
arriving at the true construction of the instrument. 
72 AM. JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds § 246, at 751. Here, the evidence shows no estate 
owned by Smith or the Oral Partnership in the subject real estate sufficient to meet the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The 1966 Document at no time describes any estate or interest in the subject 
real property owned by D. A. Osguthorpe, or, for that matter, the Oral Partnership. It 
simply proffers a property description. Thus, the 1966 Document begs the question of 
whether the "interest" it refers to is a license, a lease for some term, ownership, or no 
interest at all. Since it does not define what is to be conveyed to D. A. Osguthorpe 
through the "sale" referenced of the "interest" and because there is no proof of 
ownership by Smith of any estate in the real property described, the 1966 Document 
does not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Even if it did, and it clearly 
does not, the same infirmities establish the lack of any consideration contained within 
the language of the 1966 Document itself. The only extrinsic evidence of consideration 
comes from the testimony of D. A. Osguthorpe, the title expert and the admissions of 
Smith that D. A. Osguthorpe has always been the record holder of title, and that 
evidence establishes that Smith and the Oral Partnership never had any estate or 
interest in the subject real property. There would thus be no consideration resulting 
from the promised conveyance by Smith. 
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assignable to the use of the real estate for purposes of Smith's claim to entitlement to 
one-half of that portion. 
B. Smith, Who Is Neither a Party Nor an Intended Third-Party 
Beneficiary of the ASCU Contract, Has No Standing To Assert, And Is 
Incorrect in His Assertion of, the Parol Evidence Rule or the Statute 
of Frauds Concerning Evidence From the Parties to the ASCU 
Contract As To Its Terms and Conditions. 
1. Statute of Frauds. 
In Garland v. Fleischmann, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that a litigant 
"is not entitled to raise the defense of the statute of frauds [where the litigant] was not a 
party to the contract, nor. . . in privity to a party to the contract." Garland v. 
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1992). The Garland case quoted with approval, 
the following language: "If the parties to the contract as in this case are willing to waive 
the requirements of the statute, a stranger to the contract cannot object." Id. (quoting 
Zwaska v. Irwin, 52 N.J. Super. 27, 33, 144 A.2d 554, 557 (1958)). Thus, Smith, who is 
a stranger to the contract and who is not an intended third-party beneficiary "lacks 
standing to raise the . . . statute of frauds." Garland. 831 P.2d at 109. 
Moreover, the trial court's ruling that the oral portion of the agreement was not 
enforceable due to the statute of frauds is, in any event, legally incorrect. "It is the 
intent and purpose of the Statute of Frauds to give to the party to an oral contract 
against whom the enforcement of the contract is sought by the other party the right to 
avail himself of the provisions of the Statute as a defense to his liability." Id. (emphasis 
in original) (citing 3 Samuel Williston, A Treatise On The Law Of Contracts § 530, at 
746 (3d Ed. 1960)). The Garland court also cited Fielland v. Wemhoff, 249 N.W. 2d 
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634, 638 (Iowa 1977), for the proposition that "if both parties admit the existence of an 
oral contract, it is irrelevant that a stranger objects[.]" Id. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-
201(3)(b) (allowing enforcement of contract for sale of goods that does not satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds where the party against whom enforcement is sought admits that a 
contract was made). Further, the undisputed evidence shows the actual performance 
of the contract precisely as the parties describe the contract. Stephen Osguthorpe and 
D. A. Osguthorpe provided services to ASCU and received the single annual payment 
and nothing else in return for those services. Because of the actual performance of 
services requested by ASCU under the agreement, ASCU would not be in a position to 
repudiate the agreement. See Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) ("Under the equitable doctrine of part performance, a court will sometimes apply 
estoppel to enforce an oral or implied agreement which has been partially or fully 
performed in reliance on the agreement."). See also Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (allowing 
power to compel specific performance of a contract "in case of part performance 
thereof.") It would be highly anomalous to place Smith, a total stranger to the contract, 
in a better position than ASCU would be, in Smith's efforts to hide from the court the 
services portion of the contract that was not placed in detail in the writing. Cf. EIE v. St 
Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) ("Though [the contract is] 
arguably clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate by their actions that to them 
the contract meant something quite different, the intent of the parties will be enforced."). 
The trial court clearly erred in barring the uncontested evidence of all parties to 
the ASCU agreement concerning what the agreement actually was and the full scope 
and extent of its existence. Upon review of that uncontroverted evidence by this Court, 
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it seems clear, as a matter of law, that the ASCU contract contained the single annual 
payment in consideration of both services to be rendered and use of the specific real 
estate during the ensuing year. 
2. Parol Evidence. 
As with the issue of standing to assert the Statute of Frauds, courts have held 
that a party lacks standing to assert the parol evidence rule where it is a stranger to the 
contract at issue. See, e.g., In re Gatlinburg Motel Enterprises, Ltd. (Newton v. 
Herskowitz), 119 B.R. 955 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) (parol evidence rule has reference 
"only to the parties to the instrument."); Director of Revenue v. Loethen Amusement, 
Inc., 753 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (state's director of revenue who "was 
not a party" or "in privity with the parties" "had no standing to invoke the parol evidence 
rule."); Nelson v. United Fire Insurance Company of New York, 275 S.C. 92, 96, 267 
S.E.2d 604, 606 (1980) ("The inadmissibility of parol evidence to vary the terms of a 
written instrument does not apply to a controversy between a third party and one of the 
parties to the instrument."); Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1951) (Parol 
evidence rule not violated by admission of testimony where party seeking to invoke rule 
"was not a party or privy of a party to such written agreement," because "the parol 
evidence is not applicable."). 
Even if Smith had standing to assert the parol evidence rule as to the ASCU, the 
extrinsic evidence offered by D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP is uncontroverted with regard 
to the fact that none of the parties intended the writings to be integrated agreements. 
Parol evidence is always admissible for the required initial determination of whether a 
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D. Even if the Property were not a partnership asset. Smith is entitled to 
his share? Qf the Lease proceeds, 
As a partner, Smith was entitled to his share of partnership proceeds. He 
retained that entitlement in the Dissolution Agreement. His right to his share of 
partnership proceeds is not contingent, however, upon the disputed Property being a 
partnership asset. That obligation arises from the Dissolution Agreement and exists 
regardless of whether the Property is a partnership asset or D. A. Osguthorpe's 
personal asset. D. A. Osguthorpe signed a written contract obligating him to give 
Smith a share of the proceeds upon sale or lease of the Property. The Osguthorpes are 
bound by that contract. 
E. The Dissolution Agreement was supported bv consideration. 
The Dissolution Agreement was supported by consideration. Paragraph 1 
identifies the partnership property, including livestock, equipment, cash and real estate. 
In paragraph 2, D. A. Osguthorpe agrees to pay Smith $50,000 for his share of those 
partnership assets. In paragraph 3 of the Dissolution Agreement, Smith agrees to 
execute and deliver to D, A. Osguthorpe "such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as 
may be necessary" to transfer partnership assets. In paragraph 5, Smith and 
D. A. Osguthorpe "release and discharge" each other from all claims arising out of 
their partnership relationships. (Dissolution Agreement, pp. 2-6; R. 8-12.) 
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The Dissolution Agreement also sets out various specific partnership disputes 
that it resolves. These include bank loans, grazing fee accounts, amounts owed to 
Enoch Smith Sons Company, tax liability, and responsibility for litigation filed against 
Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe. (Dissolution Agreement, pp. 4-5; R. 10-11.) Resolution 
of these real disputes constitutes consideration. The Osguthoipes argue that there was 
no evidence of a bona fide dispute sufficient to support consideration. The Dissolution 
Agreement puts that argument to rest: D. A. Osguthorpe agrees to hold Smith harmless 
in the litigation then pending in the Third District Court by Ed Roberts, Howard 
Whitehouse and Marion Christensen against Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe. (Dissolution 
Agreement p. 5; R. 11.) Pending litigation is a bona fide dispute. Resolution as 
between Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe of that dispute is sufficient consideration. 
Additionally, because the alleged oral side agreement between Smith and 
D. A. Osguthorpe (i.e. that the partnership had been orally dissolved prior to the 
execution of the Dissolution Agreement) does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, (as 
discussed in Section III) it is unenforceable. As a matter of law, the Dissolution 
Agreement is the only enforceable contract between the parties and its recited 
consideration supports the contract. 
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m . THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT SATISFIES THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS, THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT TO DISSOLVE THE 
PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT. 
The Statute of Frauds applies to this case in two ways. It applies with respect to 
whether the Property is a partnership asset. Because the Dissolution Agreement 
declares that the Property is a partnership asset, the Statute of Frauds is satisfied. It 
also applies with respect to whether the alleged prior oral agreement to dissolve the 
partnership was effective. Because the partnership owned real property, the Statute of 
Frauds required its dissolution to be in writing. Hence, even if there had been an oral 
agreement to dissolve the partnership, it would be of no legal effect. The Statute of 
Frauds provides: 
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by 
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by the lawful agent 
thereunto authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann, §25-5-1 (1953) 
The Osguthorpes argue that D. A. Osguthorpe did not grant any interest in the 
disputed Property to the partnership. The Statute of Frauds does not require that the 
writing grant an interest in property. It is satisfied if the writing declares an interest in 
property. In Guinand v. Walton. 450 P.2d 467 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that any writing signed by the party to be charged, which declares an interest in 
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real property satisfies the Statute of Frauds. In Guinand. Walton-Kearns argued that a 
letter did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds and therefore failed to convey any interest in 
a partnership. The letter was the only writing on the subject presented. The trial court 
ruled in favor of Guinand and Walton-Kearns appealed. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
From careful attention to the wording of that section [§ 25-
5-1] it will be seen that there is no requirement either that 
the instrument in writing demonstrate a valid consideration, 
or that it be a complete contract in any other particular. All 
that is required is that the interest be granted or declared by 
a writing subscribed by the party to be charged. For the 
purpose of establishing that there was such a grant by the 
partnership it is not essential that its assets be described with 
particularity. The purpose of the statute is that certain 
matters of great importance such as the conveyance of real 
estate should be protected against frauds and perjuries. 
Guinand. 450 P.2d at 469 (emphasis added). 
Here, the Dissolution Agreement itself satisfies Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. The 
Dissolution Agreement is a writing in which the Property is declared an asset of the 
partnership. Paragraph 1 states that Mthe partnership assets and properties covered 
hereby shall include," and then lists various categories of property. Subparagraph 1(g) 
lists and describes the Property, D. A. Osguthorpe's signature on the Dissolution 
Agreement manifests his subscription or assent. Thus, the Dissolution Agreement is a 
writing which satisfies the Statute of Frauds. 
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Whether recorded fee title of the Property was in D. A. Osguthorpe's name is of 
no legal significance. As the Dissolution Agreement declares, the Property was a 
partnership asset. By statute, the Property was a partnership asset, irrespective of 
record title. Utah Code Ann. §48-1-5 (1953). As a matter of law, a partner may 
contribute property to a partnership without transferring title. See, Utah Code Ann. 
§48-1-7. Once he does so, the partnership owns the property. 
The Osguthorpes assert that the written Dissolution Agreement is not binding, 
because D. A. Osguthorpe had a prior oral agreement with Smith. Under the terms of 
the alleged oral agreement, The Osguthorpes claim that Smith agreed to transfer all of 
the assets of the partnership, including the Property to D. A. Osguthorpe for $50,000. 
The majority rule "is that a contract requiring a transfer of land from one partner or 
joint venturer to another is within the Statute of Frauds." Johnson v. Gilbert. 621 P.2d 
916 (Ariz. App. 1980), citing 2A. Corbin, Contracts, § 411 (1950 & Supp. 1971) and 
Plummer v. Foglev. 363 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1961). An oral agreement to transfer 
property, such as The Osguthorpes assert here, is of no effect. 
The transfer of the Property to the partnership occurred by operation of law. 
The partnership statute provides that property brought into the partnership belongs to 
the partnership. It also occurred by declaration of the Dissolution Agreement. Once 
the Property became partnership property, it could not be transferred back to 
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D. A. Osguthorpe except by operation of law or conveyance or declaration in writing. 
The Osguthorpes' allegation of an oral agreement, even if true, is of no legal moment. 
IV. THE CLAIM THAT CONTINUED USE OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY 
FOR CRAZING EXEMPTS OSGUTHORPE FROM SHARING THE 
PAYMENTS FROM THE LEASE IS CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS 
TERMS OF THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT. 
The claim that, because The Osguthorpes are using the Property for grazing they 
shouldn't have to split rental payments, is flawed because it takes the Dissolution 
Agreement language out of context. The sentence: "So long as [D. A, Osguthorpe] 
shall use said real property as grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep 
or cattle business, [D. A. Osguthorpe] shall have the right to the possession and use of 
the property without compensation to [Smith]" must be read in conjunction with the 
next sentence, which says that if D. A. Osguthorpe or his successors sell or lease allor 
any part of the Property Smith will share equally in the excess rental. 
D. A. Osguthorpe's affidavit states that Smith's counsel assured him that the 
Dissolution Agreement would only require payment if Osguthorpe ceased to use the 
Property as grazing land. That statement contradicts the Dissolution Agreement, and is 
barred by the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. 
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